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Professor Laurence H. Tribe calls God Save This Honorable Court
"the untold story of how the selection of our Justices has helped chart the
course of American history."' Although he acknowledges that there have
been prior political histories of Supreme Court appointments and their
impact, he does not regard these studies as "the work of anyone steeped in
constitutional law either as a scholar of the subject or as an advocate
before the Court."2 And, as his publisher reminds us, Tribe has achieved
distinction in both capacities.$ Thus, Tribe offers to fill the need he per-
ceives for a study of Supreme Court appointments "informed by the per-
ceptions that only a thorough familiarity with the law could provide." 4
In setting out to debunk several "myths" about the appointment pro-
* Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.
t Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. My thanks to Paul Bator, EddeGrazia, Steve Friedman, David Rudenstine, and Susan Wolf, for their numerous helpful comments.
I am especially grateful to Bill Bratton; but for him, I would not have written this essay. Accordingly,
any errors in it should be blamed on him.
1. L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THis HONORABLE COURT ix (1985) [hereinafter cited by page number
only].
2. P.x.
3. P. 172 ("About the Author") and dust jacket.
4. P.x.
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cess, 5 Tribe is as much the advocate as the academic: His central conten-
tion is that in reviewing a Supreme Court nomination the Senate must
actively consider the nominee's ideology.' Given what Tribe calls the
"greying" of the present Court,' and the consequent possibility that Presi-
dent Reagan will appoint several new justices, this is a most timely thesis.
Indeed, Tribe accelerated the book's completion in large part to respond to
an October 1984 speech in which Justice (now Chief Justice-designate)
Rehnquist' declared that Presidents have enjoyed only "partial success" in
packing the Supreme Court with justices of favorable outlook.' The Jus-
tice's remarks, Tribe feared, could well "lower the public's guard, and
lessen the Senate's vigilance" when future Supreme Court nominations
are made.10
But Professor Tribe does not plead that this slender volume is a hasty
piece of work. He began it long before the Rehnquist speech," and much
of it, he notes, "represents . . I more years of research and of reflection
about the Supreme Court and its role than I care to confess." '12 Given
such extensive effort by so eminent a scholar, one might expect a notable
contribution. The book fails to meet that expectation, and fails badly.
Tribe's principal thesis is that a Senator should apply a two-part test in
determining the ideological fitness of a nominee for the Supreme Court.
First, the nominee must adhere to the "American vision . . . of a just
society."' In other words, some views are so extreme in our society that a
Senator would justifiably regard as unfit a nominee who holds them. With
that broad statement I agree, but for reasons discussed below I would
define the class of acceptable views more broadly than Tribe does. In any
event, there have been very few nominees who would fail even Tribe's
more rigorous version of this standard; arguably, there have been none.
The cutting edge of Tribe's test, then, is the second part: The nominee
must not appear likely to upset the "overall balance" of the Court's ideol-
ogy. In this essay, I will present in some detail reasons why I regard this
standard as unworkable and improvident.
Two of the principal defects in Tribe's argument are his misleading use
5. Pp. x-xi, xvii.
6. Pp. 106-37.
7. Pp. xv-xvi.
8. [Editors' Note: This essay was written before Chief Justice Burger's announcement of his re-
tirement, and thus before President Reagan's consequent nominations of Justice Rehnquist as Chief
Justice and Judge Scalia as Associate Justice.]
9. W. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court 4-5 (address delivered at Uni-




13. P. 96 (emphasis omitted).
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of history and his failure to recognize the double-edged cut of his test.
Because the remarkable dedication to this book foreshadows both of these
problems, it warrants close examination:
TO CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL
whose exalted place in our country's history might have been filled
by a qualified, but less visionary, judge had the Senate not rejected
President George Washington's nomination of John Rutledge.14
These are arresting words. John Marshall never Chief Justice! That is
a parade of horribles all by itself. The natural inference to draw from
Tribe's language is that Marshall filled the vacancy created by the rejec-
tion of Rutledge.15 Only those who know some early Supreme Court his-
tory will recall that it was Oliver Ellsworth, not John Marshall, whom
Washington nominated after Rutledge's defeat; only after Ellsworth re-
signed, more than four years later, did Washington's successor John Ad-
ams name Marshall to the Supreme Bench.
But Tribe appears to be inviting us to indulge in retrospective specula-
tion as to what would have happened had Rutledge been confirmed in
1795. If we accept his invitation, the critical fact is that Rutledge died in
June 1800, just a few months before Ellsworth resigned; both events oc-
curred while Adams was President. Thus, Tribe's suggestion that Rut-
ledge "might . . .have held [the Chief Justiceship] into the 1800s," is at
best only technically correct.17 (Perhaps Tribe is speculating that the joys
of riding circuit, although a factor that dissuaded John Jay from reassum-
ing the seat, would have extended Rutledge's life.1") One cannot be any-
thing close to certain, 9 but the best guess is that Rutledge's successor
14. P. vii.
15. Rutledge actually served a few months as Chief Justice, because Washington had given him a
recess appointment.
16. Others will find out soon enough, because Tribe fills out the back of his book, pp. 142-51,
with a useful table, taken from THE SUPREME COURT. JUSTICE AND THE LAW (M. Wormser 3d ed.
1983), providing information on all Supreme Court nominations from the beginning of the Court. In
his text, Tribe acknowledges the interregnum between Jay and Marshall, but in a curious way appar-
ently suggesting that Marshall's nomination in 1801 was somehow linked to Ellsworth's in 1796. Pp.
55 ("Ellsworth's prompt [sic) resignation paved the way" for the Marshall nomination), & 79 ("Ells-
worth [kept] the nation's highest judicial seat warm just long enough for President Adams to name
John Marshall ... .
17. P. 79.
18. Letter from Jay to Adams (Jan. 2, 1801), reprinted in 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUB-
LIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 284-86 (H. Johnston ed. 1893) (declining nomination, primarily because
of Congress's failure to reform judicial system); Turner, The Appointment of ChiefJustice Marshall,
17 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 143, 149-53 (1960) (Jay evidently took with little seriousness judicial
reform bill, which would have freed justices of circuit duties, and indeed took far more seriously
failure to pass bill not withstanding approaching end of 6th Congress). For a discussion of the Jus-
tices' circuit riding responsibilities in this era, see F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESs OF
THE SUPREME COURT 87 (1927).
19. It is difficult to know with any confidence how the Moving Finger would have written one
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would have been none other than John Marshall-who might thus have
been able to begin filling his exalted place in our country's history a little
sooner.
20
And even if we could say in any meaningful sense that Rutledge's rejec-
tion contributed to Marshall's selection, it is difficult to discern what
bearing this hypothesized fact might have on the standard that the Senate
should use in reviewing Supreme Court nominations. Surely Tribe does
not mean to suggest that Senators voting on Rutledge's nomination should
have been prescient as to whether Rutledge or Washington's then un-
known second choice would be more likely to leave the Court at just the
right time to be succeeded by a visionary Chief. Nor can he mean that the
Senate should confirm only nominees as "visionary" as Marshall; under
that standard the Court would rarely have a single member, much less a
quorum. Rather, Tribe's implication must be that the Senate's rejection of
a nominee based on his substantive views, as in the case of Rutledge,21 can
lead to the selection of a great judge like Marshall.
And so it might. But the reader is entitled to wonder from the very start
about the flip side. If the Senate exercises ideological opposition without
extreme restraint, might this not more often lead in the long run to the
rejection of nominees like Brandeis and Hughes-two of "this century's
most esteemed Justices," according to Tribe?2-and to the selection of
mediocrities?
It is hardly surprising that Tribe's dedication does not address this con-
cern. What is startling is that the rest of his book ignores it-as well as
much of the historical evidence that gives it weight.
line had it written an earlier line somewhat differently. Or, as Tribe puts it, "how do we forecast the
past?" P. 34. Cf. 0. KHAYYAM, THE RUBAiYAT stanza 71 (E. FitzGerald trans.) (4th ed. 1879)
(continuous postwriting motion of Moving Finger; incapacity of piety, wit, or tears to erase or alter
such writing).
20. To play the speculative game well requires some care. Rutledge died on June 21. Ellsworth,
who was in France, resigned on September 30, but Adams apparently did not receive his letter until
December 15. G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL: 1801-1815, at 103 n.158 (1981) (Volume II
of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise). The political situation changed markedly between June and
December; in particular, it became evident that Adams would not be reelected. Id. at 103. On the
other hand, even had the vacancy occurred in June, Adams would not have been able to fill it perma-
nently until November at the earliest; the Senate had adjourned on May 14, 10 ANNALS OF CONG.
183-84 (J. Gales ed. 1800), and did not again have a quorum until November 21, id. at 721-22.
There is thus little basis for believing that the relevant sequence of events-an offer to John Jay,
Jay's declination, and then the nomination of Marshall-would have been different had it begun




Vol. 95: 1283, 1986
Tribal Myths
I. FRAMEWORK
On several matters I have no quarrel with Tribe. Indeed, my chief
complaint about the first three chapters is not that they err but that they
belabor the obvious. The principal themes of these chapters are, or at any
rate should be, commonplaces in modern America: The work of the Su-
preme Court is crucial to the nation; even a single Justice can make a
substantial difference in its results; and the substantive views of a Justice
on economic, social, and political matters profoundly affect how he will
perform his function.23 We can thus take as common ground the nearly
syllogistic conclusion that the ideology of a Supreme Court Justice may
have a crucial impact on the nation.
This proposition, however, does not in itself indicate to what extent, if
any, the Senate should consider a nominee's ideology in making its confir-
mation decision. In assessing this issue, we can again begin with agree-
ment. First, Tribe is certainly correct in asserting that the Senate would
not be justified in
refusal to confirm a nominee to whom the Senators' only objection is
that the candidate would not have been their first or even second
choice. In Supreme Court appointments the Constitution allows only
the President his "druthers." Allowing each Senator to confirm
solely from the Senator's own "short list" would prescribe paralysis
in the Supreme Court appointment process.24
23. Perhaps Attorney General Meese disagrees with the last of these propositions, but in general
it can be aptly said that "we are all realists now." Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1152, 1152 (1985); Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme
Court Nominations: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1, 44-45, 83-84 (1983).
24. P. 107 (emphasis in original). In this passage, Tribe recognizes that by the nature of the
appointment process, the functions of the Senate and the President cannot be the same. Given this
fundamental role distinction, Tribe's characterization of the Senate as an "equal partner" in the ap-
pointment process, p. 132, has little meaning, cf. p. 93 ("[T]he Constitution gives the appointment
power to the President and the Senate together, one nominates and the other confirms.") (emphasis in
original). As Tribe acknowledges in another context, "[t]he appointment process requires the Senate
only to react, not to create." P. 131. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 405 (A. Hamilton) (New
American Library ed. 1961) (taking narrow view of Senate's role in appointment process); id. No. 66(A. Hamilton); J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION 172 (1965) ("As interpreted by Hamilton, the Senate's function was not to choose judges,
but rather to consent to their selection by the President.").
Neither a summary characterization such as "equal partner" nor the brief language of art. II, § 2,
cl. 2 of the Constitution is of much help in determining what standards the Senate should use in
performing that reactive function. In the context of political officers, whose appointments are governed
by the same constitutional language, the wide discretion of the President is generally conceded. See pp.
78, 134-35. This, of course, does not compel the conclusion that the President should have the same
latitude in nominating Justices; different considerations apply in the two contexts. But it does under-
cut, or at least render irrelevant, the argument sometimes made that the constitutional language sug-
gests no difference between the criteria to be used by the President and those to be used by the Senate
in the judicial appointment process. See Rees, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirma-
tion Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913, 937-38 (1983) ("early drafts of
1287
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 1283, 1986
At the other extreme, I accept Tribe's assertion that the Senate would be
justified in rejecting as unfit a nominee who does not subscribe to certain
broad principles that are "crucial to our sense of what America is all
about." 25 Or, in Tribe's alternative phrasing, a nominee to the Supreme
Court must adhere to "the American vision . . . of a just society." 28 In
the abstract, that is a hard statement to contest-to the extent we can
agree on what that "American vision" is. Certainly it does not encompass
approval of apartheid. But what other ideological positions, less extreme
but still abhorrent to some, should it exclude? This is a difficult problem,
and it cannot be resolved by a slogan.
According to Tribe, "any judicial nominee who favored overturning the
legislative apportionment cases and who denounced any role at all for the
federal judiciary in preserving the fundamental democratic principle of
'one person, one vote'" should not be approved by the Senate.27 Yet, I
seriously wonder whether the jurisprudence of Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan,28 though long rejected by a majority of the Court, is so perverse
that any otherwise suitable nominee should be disqualified simply for ad-
hering to it.29 Similarly, Tribe would disqualify "nominees who would
overrule Roe [v. Wades0] simply because they privately regard the fetus as
a 'person' and would defend all such persons regardless of the effect on a
woman's rights." 1 I agree with Tribe that such a view of personhood is
article II provided for appointment by the Senate alone, and nothing in the records of the Federal
Constitutional Convention suggests that the change to nomination by the President and confirmation
by the Senate was intended to produce a change in the factors that the Senate was supposed to con-
sider."); Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominations, 79 YALE L.J.
657, 658-59 (1970). Tribe contends at some length that, as compared to the President, the Senate is
"now more diverse, more representative, more accountable." P. 132. Certainly it is more diverse;
whether it tends better than the Presidency to reflect the temper of the electorate and whether it is
more accountable are more difficult questions. On the other side of the ledger, in some respects the
Senate is a less suitable forum than the executive for consideration of potential Supreme Court Jus-
tices. See infra text accompanying note 181. Whether or not one can reasonably conclude that the
President or the Senate is "better" suited for such consideration, such a conclusion does not undercut
the crucial factor stated above-that the Constitution gives the President a selective function, and the
Congress a reactive one, and the two are significantly different.
25. P. 94. I also agree that "[s]uch outer boundaries exist on both ends of the traditional political
spectrum, and may appropriately look a bit different to each member of the Senate," and that on some
boundaries nearly all should be able to agree. Id. I would draw the boundaries broader than would
Tribe, however. See infra Part III(C).
26. P. 96 (emphasis in original).
27. Id.
28. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266, 330 (1962) (Frankfurter & Harlan, JJ., dissenting)
(contending that apportionment of state legislatures should not be justiciable).
29. In addition, reasonable judges who find the justiciability question untroubling may find it far
from incontrovertible that "one person, one vote" should be a universal rule of our polity. See Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 748 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting, with concur-
rence of Clark, J.) ("What the Court has done is to convert a particular political philosophy into a
constitutional rule .... ").




wrongheaded, but there seem to be a lot of folks who buy it, and I am not
prepared to say that Tribe and I, but not they, are blessed with the
"American vision."
Indeed, I suspect that, if the bounds of the "American vision" are nar-
rowed, the effect will be more often to keep off the Court those who, like
Louis Brandeis, have views that appear radical to much of the Senate.
Tribe, at least faithful to his theory in this respect, characterizes the polit-
ical opposition to Brandeis as "legitimate. 3 2 But that in itself should give
us pause, suggesting that Tribe's test would tend to bar the novel, radical
thinker who over time might have the most to offer the Court. Suppose,
for example, that the nominee is the eminently able Laurence Tribe, who
has contended that the Constitution should be read as guaranteeing rights
of affirmative governmental action in providing health care, housing, em-
ployment, and education.33 Suppose also that a substantial bloc of Sena-
tors shares-as much of America evidently does-the "American vision"
currently espoused by President Reagan, in particular his abhorrence of
"big government." Could Professor Tribe say, under his test, that a fili-
buster against his nomination would be improper?
Even if a nominee passes through the "American vision" screen, an-
other-the "overall balance" test3' 4-awaits him under the Tribe system:
A Senator should vote against a nomination if he conscientiously believes
that it would "upset the Court's equilibrium or exacerbate what he views
as an already excessive conservative or liberal bias." 5
"Balance" and "equilibrium" are, of course, squishy terms. Because
Tribe answers a "resounding yes" to the question of whether the present
Court reflects a "balance worth saving," s consider this plausible elabora-
tion on the last hypothetical: The membership of the present Court re-
mains unchanged until the departure in 1990 of Justice- Rehnquist, when
President Cuomo nominates Professor Tribe to the Court.37 Should the
nomination be rejected because it would upset a "balance worth saving"?
I doubt that, even speaking from the perspective of the Reagan years,
Tribe would answer this question affirmatively. Nor, I believe, would he
say that a liberal Senator of 1943 should have voted against confirming
Wiley Rutledge because the Court had an "already excessive liberal
32. P. 91.
33. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1065, 1066 (1977).
34. P. 106.
35. P. 107 (emphasis in original).
36. P. 111.
37. It appears that Tribe would be a serious contender for the Court if Governor Cuomo or
Senators Kennedy or Hart were to become President. See p. 172 ("About the Author") & dust jacket.
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bias"-whatever that means-or that a liberal Senator of 1967 should
have voted against Thurgood Marshall for the same reason.
No, Tribe's concern is not with so elusive a concept as "balance."
Rather, his goal is to ensure that, to the extent possible, the Court is
composed of Justices who think the way he does. This becomes manifest
when Tribe explains at length his rather surprising view that the balance
on the present Court is worth saving. Time and again, he expresses fear
that new Justices might "propel the Court over the cliff on which it is
precariously perched" into the abyss of right-wing error;", at the same
time, he obviously would welcome a far more liberal Court. 9
Although Tribe tends to assume that his readers agree with his views,
40
I suspect that he is in a distinct minority in many of the constitutional
issues that he discusses.41 And if Senators whose substantive views accord
with Tribe's are to vote against a nominee likely to push the Court in a
direction they do not want, Senators of opposing views-who might think
the Court already leans too far to the left-would be entitled to follow the
same practice. The result would be that any Senator would vote against
any nominee whose views he disliked, or at least any nominee whose
views he disliked very much. If Tribe is in the minority, as I suspect, then
over the long run his standard would tend to work against the implemen-
tation of his views more often than in favor of them; indeed, few of us can
38. P. 113; accord pp. 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122.
39. See, e.g., p. 111 (listing areas in which the Burger Court has been deficient from liberal point
of view).
40. See, e.g., discussions at pp. 12, 21-22, and 22, respectively, of Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) ("bad news" that four Justices dissented), General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976) (by passing subsequent legislation Congress "effectively [told] the Supreme
Court that it had made a glaring mistake" in allowing an "obviously discriminatory" practice), and
Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984) (7-2 decision presented as example of how "some-
times the Congress finds the Supreme Court's statutory misinterpretations more difficult to
overturn").
Tribe appears to assume that his readers share not merely liberal views but his particular views.
Note in particular his conclusory discussion of two highly significant cases that are as controversial
within as between political camps. He presents Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), as an illustration
to impress readers of how the Burger Court has shown "insensitivity to legislative attempts to promote
equality." P. 117. He does not indicate that many of those who challenged the campaign finance act
at issue in that case-including such plaintiffs as Eugene J. McCarthy, Stewart R. Mott, and the
New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8; Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821,
833 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1975)-are hardly insensitive to attempts to promote equality. Similarly, he al-
ludes to INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), as an illustration of the Burger Court's "distressing
tendency to side with the President in resolving controversies over the separation of powers." P. 118.
He does not reveal that the Chadha litigation was successfully conducted by Ralph Nader's Public
Interest Litigation Group, or that many liberals welcomed the Court's decision because they saw the
legislative veto as an invitation to Congress to abdicate its responsibility.
41. See, e.g., pp. 8-9 (vigorously supporting exclusionary rule), 116 (criticizing male-only mili-
tary registration law), 111 (criticizing the Burger Court, inter alia, for being "insensitive to the rights
of prisoners and criminal defendants . . . too deferential to executive and bureaucratic authority ...




have confidence that over the long run our views on controversial ques-
tions will prevail substantially more often than not in open political battle.
In general, ideological opposition of the sort that Tribe proposes would
politicize the selection process more than it would shift the Court either to
the left or right.42
Before accepting such a political free-for-all, a careful analysis of its
costs and benefits is appropriate. The benefit of rejecting a Supreme
Court nominee on ideological grounds is obvious: It keeps off the Supreme
Court a nominee who might cast votes that the Senate believes would be
unacceptable and even dangerous. For several reasons, I believe this bene-
fit is less significant and less certain than might appear. Part II of this
essay reviews the historical record to present some of these considerations.
Part III continues discussion of the benefit side of the ledger and also
contends that Tribe underestimates the costs of ideological opposition to
Supreme Court nominations. Finally, Part III offers a test, far more re-
strained than Tribe's, that I believe gives proper weight to both the costs
and benefits of such opposition.
II. HISTORY
Section A of this part demonstrates that the ideological stance of a Jus-
tice, particularly over the long run, is often difficult to predict at the time
of his nomination. Section B shows that, in large part because of limita-
tions on the power of any President to shape the Court in his own image,
ideological review is rarely necessary to prevent the Court from becoming
extremist. Section C contends that, as judged with the perspective of his-
torical hindsight, ideological review has not on balance improved the ideo-
logical make-up of the Court significantly, if at all; nor is it likely that
more intense ideological review would have caused any substantial im-
provement of this nature.
A. Surprised Presidents and Senators
No matter how important a Justice's substantive views may be, ideolog-
ical consideration at the time of his nomination is futile to the extent that
it is impossible to predict what those views will be over the course of his
career on the Court. A Justice's ideological performance, of course, is not
as unpredictable as the flip of a coin; Franklin Roosevelt was not simply
42. Not surprisingly, both liberal and conservative Senators have taken the view, when the nomi-
nee has been to their liking, that ideological opposition is inappropriate, but have not consistently
adhered to that view when they have disliked the nominee. Friedman, supra note 23, at 90; see also
Powe, Book Review, 54 Tx. L. REv. 891, 892 (1976) (Senator Philip Hart "abandoned his position
held at the Fortas hearings when the realization hit him and the other liberals that Republican presi-
dents are also allowed Supreme Court appointments.").
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lucky that all his nominees looked benignly on the exercise of governmen-
tal power to address economic problems, and one would have been justi-
fied in betting heavily that William Rehnquist would take an ideological
position on the Court to the right of Thurgood Marshall. Most Justices fit
at least very roughly the expectations that Presidents and Senators have at
the time of nomination. But in this Section I will show that there have
been a substantial number of surprises, enough so that a Senator consider-
ing opposition should take into account the real possibility that his ideo-
logical prediction will prove to be unduly pessimistic.
Tribe does not agree and takes up cudgels against what he calls "the
myth of the surprised President." Although "rude surprises have oc-
curred," he says, "they are few;" '43 "[f]or the most part, and especially in
areas of particular and known concern to a President, Justices have been
loyal to the ideals and perspectives of the men who have nominated
them." 44
But this conclusion is of limited relevance in assessing the proper Sen-
ate role in reviewing nominees for the Court. If we want to judge the
efficacy of ideological Senate opposition to Court nominees, the real ques-
tion is whether Senators, not Presidents, have been surprised by the subse-
quent ideological orientation of Justices. Focusing on the question of Pres-
idential, rather than Senatorial, surprise serves Tribe's advocacy purpose.
For one thing, the President is better situated than the Senate to avoid
surprise.45 More significantly, Tribe's limited focus offers him an argu-
ment for writing off much evidence that appears unfavorable to his thesis.
Did James C. McReynolds turn out far more conservative than had been
expected and Earl Warren far more progressive? No problem, says
Tribe-Presidents Wilson and Eisenhower were not surprised, because
they simply were not concentrating on ideology when they made the
nominations.4" Indeed, suggests Tribe, to the extent that Presidents have
considered substantive views at all in making their nominations, most have
focused not on long term matters of approach and philosophy but on im-
mediate political and doctrinal issues. On those clear and present issues,
Tribe argues at length, Presidents have had a very high rate of success;
47
on others that may arise over the long term, he briefly acknowledges, the
record has been much spottier.48
This curious emphasis points to another limitation on the relevance of
43. P. 76.
44. P. 50.
45. See infra text accompanying note 181.
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Tribe's conclusion: As he acknowledges elsewhere,4 9 issues that are not
given much consideration at the time a Justice is nominated often turn out
to matter most over the course of a career on the Bench. A Justice is likely
to sit on the Court long after the issues that raged at the time of his
nomination have faded;50 indeed, the issues that are uppermost in the
minds of the President and the public at the time of the nomination might
be only a small part of the Court's work even during the years immedi-
ately following.51 We all know that pigeonholes like "Federalist," "lib-
eral," and "conservative" are very misleading, covering a multitude of dif-
ferences and confusing a nominee's judicial and political views. But in
predicting a nominee's long-term judicial outlook, beyond the issues al-
ready of concern, one often cannot reasonably hope to do much more than
place him in some such broad category.52
Having focused his inquiry on Presidential surprise and on issues of
known and particular concern, Tribe simply ignores many of the cases in
which a Justice's career on the Supreme Bench has belied even very gen-
eral predictions made at the time of his nomination. Nowhere do we learn
from Tribe that Justice John McLean, by drifting in the direction of the
Whigs, "moved as far from the camp of Jackson, who had appointed him,
as did Story from that of James Madison;"53 that another Jackson ap-
pointee, Roger B. Taney, so continued the jurisprudence of his predeces-
sor that Henry Clay, who had bitterly opposed the nomination, later told
him, "I am satisfied now that no man in the United States could have
49. Pp. 97-98; see also Tribe, Amending the Constitution by Default, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29,
1985, § IV, at 21, col. 2 ("There can be no single issue justices.").
50. E.g., pp. 97-98 (Taney wrote Dred Scott opinion long after there ceased to be cases relating
to Bank of United States.). Consider also the far different judicial careers of Justices Samuel Freeman
Miller and Stephen J. Field, both Lincoln appointees and both members of the Court for decades
after the Civil War. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 57 (1873) (Miller, J.,
writing for majority); id. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting).
51. Again, Taney is a good illustration. See, e.g., Letter from J. Turner to Editor, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 1985, at A30, col. 4 ("lifeblood of the bank had been drained," with federal deposits with-
drawn and federal charter about to expire, by time Taney was appointed Chief Justice). Similarly, if
one explains Richard Nixon's appointments, as Tribe does, pp. 53, 71, solely in terms of the "liw and
order" issue, then one should acknowledge that only a minority of the Burger Court's most significant
decisions have been in that area. See, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (unanimous opinion
written by Burger, C.J., and with concurrence of two other Nixon appointees); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (three Nixon Justices in majority, including author of majority opinion); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (per Burger, C.J.). In general, the Burger
Court has been characterized by continuity with the jurisprudence of the Warren Court as much as or
more than by retrenchment. See generally THE BURGER COURT:. THE COUNTER-REvOLUTION THAT
WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983). Even in the area of criminal law, the Burger Court has cut back much
less than was anticipated, and in some cases has even invigorated, doctrines established by the Warren
Court. See Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is
It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in id. at 62-91.
52. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
53. C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY
PERIOD: 1836c64, at 47 (1974) (Volume V of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise).
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been selected more abundantly able to wear the ermine which Chief Jus-
tice Marshall honored;"" that Harlan Fiske Stone, a rather conservative
Attorney General under Calvin Coolidge whose appointment to the Court
was urged by William Howard Taft, moved so dramatically in the liberal
direction that the great fighting progressive George Norris came to regret
his leading role in opposing confirmation;55 that several progressive Sena-
tors "quietly expressed regrets" for their opposition to the nomination as
Chief Justice of Charles Evans Hughes, who proved to be far more mod-
erate than they had expected, and in some areas decidedly liberal;"8 that
at least two of Franklin Roosevelt's appointees, Stanley Reed and Felix
Frankfurter, proved to be far more conservative than might have appeared
when they were nominated;57 that Byron R. White, the only appointee of
John F. Kennedy to serve an extended term on the Court, has on the
whole been mildly conservative; or that in some respects Harry A. Black-
mun, a Nixon appointee, has proven surprisingly liberal.58
But even within his own focus on Presidents' surprise as to issues of
known and particular concern to them, Tribe treats evidence unfavorable
to his thesis rather cavalierly, sometimes belittling it, sometimes mis-
characterizing it, and sometimes ignoring it. 59
The early Republicans. As Tribe acknowledges, Joseph Story, ap-
pointed by the Democratic-Republican James Madison, "proved to be an
54. C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 450 (1935).
55. R. NEUBERGER & S. KAHN, INTEGRITY: THE LIFE OF GEORGE W. NORRIS 342-43 (1937).
56. 2 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 661 (1951).
57. During his nineteen years on the Court, Reed, a former New Deal Solicitor General, accepted
modem social and economic legislation, and he joined in the Court's civil rights jurisprudence. But he
exercised a moderating influence on the Court. He was a 'center judge,' occupying generally a
middle position between the Court's conservative and liberal wings, between the apostles of
judicial activism and self-restraint. . . . In the area of civil liberties, which got increasingly
more attention the longer he stayed on the Court, Reed was less likely to favor the use of
judicial power, and more inclined to support the government and public order against the
claims of individual right and freedom.
Pritchett, Stanley Reed, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
1789,1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2371, 2373 (1969).
Frankfurter began in his first decade on the Court, and continued throughout his career, to disap-
point liberals and to give unexpected satisfaction to conservatives. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L. REV. 357, 357 (1949); Sacks, Felix Frankfurter, in 3 L. FRIED-
MAN & F. ISRAEL, supra, at 2399, 2416. Naturally, attempting to classify Frankfurter on a liberal-
conservative continuum is hopeless and perhaps sterile; the point is that Frankfurter failed to conform
to the predictions and perceptions about him made when he was nominated.
58. Tribe does assert that "Justice Blackmun has been quite liberal on racial issues coming before
the Court and has been a key figure in the Court's development of pro-choice principles in the abor-
tion area." P. 35. But Tribe makes this point in another context, in which he is discussing not the
surprise issue but the question of what effect rejecting one nominee might have; Tribe's point is that
Blackmun has proved to have more acceptable views than Nixon's prior nominee for the seat, G.
Harrold Carswell. Interestingly, Tribe does not compare Blackmun to Nixon's first nominee for the
seat, Clement F. Haynsworth, whom Tribe later describes as "a judge of some distinction. . . whose
integrity may . . . have been unfairly denigrated." P. 82.
59. See also, in addition to the discussion below, supra note 51 ("law and order" orientation of
Burger Court has been less than was anticipated).
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even more committed Federalist than Chief Justice Marshall." But, Tribe
explains, Madison "had only himself to blame," for he had been warned
by members of his party, and especially by Thomas Jefferson, that Story
had Federalistic tendencies.60 This explanation is far too glib. It is true
that Story had already given some evidence of such tendencies,61 although
Jefferson seems to have based his judgment primarily on the ambiguous
stand that Story, largely in response to constituency pressure, took on the
Embargo Laws.62 But Madison, who was resolved to appoint a Republi-
can,"3 did not act incomprehensibly in choosing Story. The nominee had
been a Republican member of Congress and Speaker of the Massachusetts
House of Representatives, and his nomination was received with contempt
by most of the Federalists of his state, who regarded him as a distasteful
partisan. 4 Nor, it appears, was Madison alone in his assessment; al-
though there may have been little enthusiasm for Story in the Sen-
ate-which was "completely controlled" by the Republicans yet had over-
whelmingly rejected Madison's prior appointment of Alexander
Wolcott 6 -the nomination was confirmed, apparently without difficulty,
in three days. 6
So score one for Jefferson the Kibitzer. But when the Sage himself was
on the firing line rather than the sideline, his aim was not so sure. Cer-
tainly he was highly motivated to pick Justices who shared his point of
view. And yet, as Tribe acknowledges, Jefferson's three appointees-as
well as Madison's two and the one chosen by the third Republican Presi-
dent, James Monroe-"over a thirty-year period. . . filed not one dissent
to the key Federalist rulings of the Marshall Court. 61 7 Tribe's explana-
tion, that the six "were either mesmerized or overwhelmed by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall,"68 not only ignores the conclusion of the most thorough
study of the early Marshall Court,69 but also hobbles his own thesis: If
60. P. 53. Cf. R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 70-71 (1985) (national-
istic tendencies more acceptable to Madison than to Jefferson).
61. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 417-19 (rev. ed. 1926).
62. Dunne, Joseph Story, in 1 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 57, at 433, 437-38; G.
HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 392-93.
63. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 61, at 414.
64. See id. at 415-417.
65. P. 81.
66. See pp. 142-43; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 61, at 415.
67. P. 56. See pp. 142-43. This is perhaps a greater concession than is warranted, see Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827) (Thompson, J., dissenting); Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 628 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting), but not by very much.
68. P. 56.
69. G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 394 ("When one examines the conduct of all
of the Jeffersonian-Republican appointees, there is little basis for supposing a pervasive and all-
encompassing 'influence' by Chief Justice Marshall. Indeed, if Republican judges became neo-
Federalists, that seems to have been a natural development from their past experiences and
commitments.").
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one Chief can bludgeon six Justices into submission for an extended pe-
riod, a President can have no confidence that his nominees' ideological
performance will conform to his expectationsY
Andrew Jackson.71 Tribe emphasizes, perhaps somewhat more than the
facts justify, the role of Andrew Jackson's struggle against the second
Bank of the United States in guiding his appointments." It might seem
embarrassing, then, that a Jackson appointee, Henry Baldwin, provided
the swing vote in Craig v. Missouri,73 a decision of great political impor-
tance that gave a boost to the Bank by invalidating loan certificates issued
by state banks. But Tribe attempts to escape: "Although [he] joined the
majority, Baldwin had taken his seat on the Court only a few weeks
before the decision was rendered; he later recanted."74 Again, Tribe's fac-
ile explanation does not suffice. That Baldwin's anti-Jackson vote came so
soon after he joined the Court might well suggest not that it was unsur-
prising, but that sometimes surprises occur quickly. And if in fact Bald-
win later "recanted," '  it only reemphasizes what we all know-that Jus-
tices sometimes change their minds, sometimes surprisingly so.
Abraham Lincoln. Tribe contends that Abraham Lincoln's five Court
appointees were faithful to his wartime policies. This is true only to a
70. Moreover, Tribe's theory does not help to explain those instances in which Marshall's col-
leagues took a federalist stance without his participation, see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), or took
one more extreme than his own, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824) (Johnson,
J., concurring); G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 393-94 (probable moderating influ-
ence of Marshall on Story's federalist views).
71. In a trivial but rather amusing error, Tribe refers to Jackson as a "native son" of Tennessee.
P. 57. In fact, "Jackson has been accredited with eight birthplaces or one more than Homer"-and
none of them in Tennessee. M. JAMES, ANDREW JACKSON: THE BORDER CAPTAIN 368 n.17 (1933).
James offers a comprehensive discussion of the "seasoned controversy" between the two chief contend-
ers, North Carolina and South Carolina, and supports the latter's claim. Id. at 368-74.
72. Pp. 56-58, 97. It is true, of course, that "[iun 1833 and 1834 there was no more precise test of
loyalty to the Jackson Administration" than one's attitude toward the second Bank. C. SWISHER,
supra note 53, at 54. But by the time Jackson nominated Taney for the Chief Justiceship in Decem-
ber, 1835, and even more so by the time of Jackson's last two nominations in March, 1837, the issue
receded, in large part because it would have been all but impossible for judicial events to undo Jack-
son's victory over the Bank. See Letter from J. Turner to Editor, N.Y. Times, supra note 51. The
Court's decision in Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837), which Tribe empha-
sizes as having driven a nail in the Bank's coffin, p. 58, aroused less interest than might have been
expected when it was argued earlier that year. C. SWISHER, supra note 53, at 106. Indeed, "even
Whigs were fully aware that the country needed the currency provided by state bank notes [the valid-
ity of which was at issue in Briscoe], and needed it all the more now that the Bank of the United
States had been reduced to the level of, or transformed into, a mere state bank in Pennsylvania." Id.
at 107-08.
73. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830).
74. P. 57.
75. Tribe contends that Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837), "essentially
reversed" Craig. P. 58. Perhaps so, but Baldwin himself contended that the facts of the two cases
were distinguishable, and that Marshall, as well as he, would have voted the other way in Craig if its
facts more closely resembled those in Briscoe. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 61, at 27-28.
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limited extent, and Tribe presents the evidence in a rather tilted way.78
Most striking is his treatment of the celebrated episode concerning the
Legal Tender Acts, the fiscal keystone of Lincoln's Administration. Tribe
acknowledges that two of Lincoln's nominees joined the 4-3 majority in-
validating the Acts in Hepburn v. Griswold, but he uses the litigator's
ploy of emphasizing the best face of bad evidence: "[T]he three dissenting
Justices were all Lincoln appointees-only two of his five appointees
voted to invalidate the Legal Tender Acts."78 The technique should not
distract us; surely the big story is not that three Lincoln appointees sup-
ported this key legislation but that two did not. And the even bigger story
is that one of the two was Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, who as Lin-
coln's Secretary of the Treasury had helped draft the Acts. Tribe men-
tions that fact,79 but he does not acknowledge the irony that Chase was
chosen in large part because of his presumed reliability on the legal tender
issue.80 Lincoln explained the nomination by commenting that
we wish for a Chief Justice who will sustain what has been done in
regard to emancipation and the legal tenders. We cannot ask a man
what he will do, and if we should, and he should answer us, we
should despise him for it. Therefore we must take a man whose
opinions are known."'
Whether Chase's turnabout was a genuine act of moral courage or, as
was generally perceived at the time, simply a maneuver in his attempt to
gain the Democratic Presidential nomination,82 is an interesting question.
76. For example, Tribe misleadingly plays down the contemporary significance of Ex parte Milli-
gan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See Friedman, supra note 23, at 9-10 & n. 41 (discussing powerful
Congressional reaction to Milligan); 1 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 18640c88, at 185-229 (1971) (Volume VI of the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise) (discussing public reaction to Milligan). Further, Tribe rather sur-
prisingly claims Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), as a prime example of how the
Lincoln appointees validated Lincoln's constitutional theories. Pp. 60-61. Even assuming that Chief
Justice Chase's opinion for the majority should be read as such an endorsement, the Lincoln appoin-
tees split 3-2 on the case while the more senior Justices split 2-1. Only with some work could one
deduce these facts from Tribe. P. 61.
77. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
78. P. 62 (emphasis added).
79. P. 61.
80. Cf. 1 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 76, at 689 ("how simple and right the resort to legal tender
notes was made to appear in a speech by Secretary Chase. .. ").
81. Quoted in 2 G. BouTWELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 29 (1902).
Interestingly, Judge Mikva quotes the next-to-last sentence of this passage in support of his position
that the President and Senate should not ask a nominee probing questions to elicit his ideological
views but may appropriately take into account his views previously expressed. Mikva,Judge Picking,
10 DisT. LAWYER 37, 40 (1985). Given the dramatic turnabout by Chase, the nominee chosen by
Lincoln on this basis, there is considerable irony in Judge Mikva's use of the quotation.
82. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 17 & n. 95; B. SCHWARTz, FROM CONFEDERATION TO
NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1835n1877, at 226 (1973).
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But there is no denying that it was a dramatic, and surprising, failure of
Lincoln's strategy."
Theodore Roosevelt. Perhaps more than any previous President, Theo-
dore Roosevelt carefully evaluated the substantive views of potential Su-
preme Court nominees.8 As he explained to his close friend Henry Cabot
Lodge, "I should hold myself as guilty of an irreparable wrong to the
nation if I should put [on the Court] any man who was not absolutely
sane and sound on the great national policies for which we stand in public
life."' 5 And yet his first appointee, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., while
still a very junior Justice wrote a narrow-minded dissent in Northern Se-
curities Co. v. United States,"8 the most important trust-busting case
brought by the Roosevelt Administration. Roosevelt reportedly exclaimed,
"I could carve out of a banana a judge with more backbone than that!"87
Tribe shrugs off this well-known incident, first by noting-rather in-
congruously, given his prior argument about the potential importance of
dissents 88-that "Holmes's opinion was a dissent that did not alter the
outcome a bit."89 More seriously, Tribe contends that "on the other issues
dear to President Roosevelt's heart . . . Justice Holmes cast consistently
progressive votes and gave his President every reason to be pleased." 90
Somehow, however, Roosevelt himself did not see it that way; four years
after the appointment he wrote to Lodge that Holmes was "a bitter disap-
83. With the votes of two new members chosen by President Grant, the Court soon overruled
Hepburn in The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). But this does not justify Tribe's
characterization of the entire legal tender episode as a triumph of perspicacity in selecting Justices.
The two new Justices, William Strong and Joseph Bradley, had been considered for vacancies long
before the Grant Administration knew how Hepburn would be decided. 1 C. FAIRMAN, supra note
76, at 719-32; Farman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal
Tender Cases, 54 HARv. L. REv. 977, 978-79 (1941). Although Tribe may be correct that Strong's
and Bradley's likely stance on the Act was an important factor in the decision to nominate them, it
would have been difficult for Grant to pick two qualified Republican lawyers who did not believe the
Act constitutional. C. HuGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNTrED STATES 53 (1928); 2 C.
WARREN, supra note 61, at 517-18. Indeed, one of the two Lincoln appointees who voted against the
Act, Stephen J. Field, was a Democrat, I C. FAIRMAN, supra note 76, at 4, and the other, Chase,
was an aspirant for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency, id. at 521, 527-57, 1465-66; B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 226. That the other five Republican appointees voted in favor of the
Act was no surprise. See I C. FAIRMAN, supra note 76, at 698-700 (nearly uniform rejection of
challenges before state courts; virtually all Republican judges sustained statute, while Democrats op-
posed it); 2 C. WARREN, supra note 61, at 499-500 (anticipation before Hepburn that Act would be
upheld).
84. Friedman, supra note 23, at 41-42.
85. 1 SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY
CABOT LODGE, 1884e.1918, at 519 (H. Lodge ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as ROOSEVELT-LODGE
LETTERS].
86. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
87. W. HARBAUGH, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 161 (1961).
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pointment, not because of any one decision but because of his general
attitude.""1 Tribe fails even to mention this remarkable, and well-known,
confession. 9
2
Nor does Tribe discuss Roosevelt's second appointee, William R. Day,
whose "position in [the Court's] ideological lineup remained equivocal"
throughout nearly two decades on the Court "because of the curiously
ambivalent legal philosophy which he brought with him to the bench."' 93
In particular, although in other contexts Tribe emphasizes Hammer v.
Dagenhart94 as a particularly notorious 5-4 decision,95 he does not point
out that this Roosevelt appointee authored the majority opinion, which
took a highly un-Rooseveltian view of the federal power over interstate
commerce. Nor does he mention The Employers' Liability Cases,98 an-
other case in which Day provided the swing vote, this time to invalidate
an important enactment97 signed by Roosevelt himself. 8
Harry Truman. In one of the most celebrated cases in American his-
tory, two of Harry Truman's four appointees joined the majority holding
that Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills was unconstitutional. 9
Tribe dismisses this incident, because in his view the steel crisis was
"wholly unpredictable" at the time of the appointments, raising an "as yet
unforeseen issue."'100 Rather, Tribe argues, in choosing his Justices, Tru-
91. Letter from Roosevelt to Lodge (Sept. 4, 1906), reprinted in 5 THE LErEs OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 396 (E. Morison ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as LETrRS OF TR] (emphasis added).
92. Although Holmes certainly did cast many votes that should have pleased Roosevelt, Holmes's
Northern Securities dissent cannot be dismissed as a stray departure from an otherwise "consistent"
path in accord with Roosevelt's views. See United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911) (adopting
over a dissent a narrow view of one of the prohibitions of Roosevelt's Pure Food and Drug Act); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911) (dissenting from applica-
tion of Sherman Act to resale price maintenance and displaying misunderstanding of fundamental
economics); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (dissenting from holding that scheme
designed to bind agricultural workers to employers was peonage proscribed by Thirteenth Amend-
ment and federal statute). See also infra note 131 (Roosevelt's view on peonage).
93. Watts, William R. Day, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 57, 1773, at 1783-84.
94. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
95. Pp. 32, 65.
96. 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
97. The Employers' Liability Act of June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232.
98. Roosevelt's final appointee, William H. Moody, gave every indication that he was cut out of
the Roosevelt mold, but a crippling illness forced Moody to leave the Court after less than four years.
Watts, William Moody, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 57, 1801, at 1816-21. Roosevelt
selected Moody only after being dissuaded, primarily on narrow partisan grounds, see infra text
accompanying note 129, from appointing Horace Lurton, who eventually did reach the Court and
followed a substantially less progressive path. See A. BICKEs. & B. SCHMIDT, HISTORY OF THE SU-
PREME COURT: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: 1910,1921, at 335-39 (Volume
IX of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise).
99. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justices Burton and Clarkjoined the majority, while Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Minton dissented. It was probably in
large part because of this vote that Truman later levied a characteristically pungent assessment of
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man "cared about three things: support for government regulatory author-
ity, sympathy for the civil rights of blacks, and a stern appreciation of the
needs of internal security during the Cold War. He got what he
wanted."101
For several reasons, this attempted demurrer fails. For one thing, even
accepting as true Tribe's assertion that the monumental Steel Seizure is-
sue was unforeseeable at the time of the nominations, it gives away too
much of his case. That is, the unforeseeability argument reemphasizes a
crucial factor limiting the importance of a President's ability to predict
how his nominees will stand on issues already apparent: Over the long
run, the issues not apparent at the time of nomination will likely prove to
be equally, if not more, significant.
Second, Tribe's premise, that the basic issue in the Steel Seizure case
was unforeseeable when Truman made his nominations, is false. As Jus-
tice Frankfurter's well-known concurrence demonstrates, there had been
numerous Presidential seizures of industrial plants and facilities through-
out history, including at least three in the 1940's under circumstances
comparable to those of the steel seizure.1 02 And certainly the broader
question of the breadth of nonstatutory Presidential powers was a live
one.1" To suggest that in making his nominations Truman considered
other issues to the exclusion of this one ignores both the legal context of
the time and the nature of Harry Truman.
Finally, even assuming the truth of Tribe's other unsupported proposi-
tion-that the three issues he lists were the only ones considered by Tru-
man in making his nominations-the conclusion that Truman "got what
he wanted" is overstated. Tribe lists eight decisions in which Truman
appointees voted on the side of civil rights for blacks.104 He does not men-
tion that, in all eight, all the non-Truman appointees also voted on that
side of that case; all eight were unanimous decisions. Nor does he mention
that in Morgan v. Virginia,'1 5 the first important civil rights decision of
Truman's term, Justice Burton-the only Truman appointee already on
the Bench-was the only dissenter from the Court's holding that Vir-
ginia's "Jim Crow" law was unconstitutional as applied to buses moving
in interstate commerce. And in pointing to the participation in Brown v.
Board of Education0" of "[t]he three Truman appointees still on the
101. Id.
102. 343 U.S. at 612-13, 613 app. II (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484, 485-88
(1940) (relying, in part, on constitutional rather than statutory power to support acquisition by execu-
tive agreement of rights to establish military bases abroad).
104. P. 69.
105. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
106. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Court in 1954,"17 Tribe does not mention the role very nearly played by
Chief Justice Vinson, the Truman appointee who had just departed. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, a member of the Brown Court,
was certain that the Chief Justice had been the chief obstacle to the
Court's prospects of reaching a humanitarian and judicially defensi-
ble settlement of the monumental segregation cases. In view of Vin-
son's passing just before the Brown reargument, Frankfurter re-
marked to a former law clerk, "This is the first indication I have
ever had that there is a God.""'
In sum, even on issues of known and particular concern at the time of
nomination, surprises are not rare. On other issues, one cannot reasonably
hope to do more than draw a very wide circle within which the new Jus-
tice is expected to fit, and even that prediction cannot be made with great
confidence.
Just as issues change, so do Justices. Sometimes, as in the case of
Harlan Stone, this seems to be largely because the Court exposes a Justice
to a new set of influences;1"9 sometimes, as was probably true in the case
of Earl Warren, it may be because the Court protects a Justice from an
old set of pressures; 10 sometimes, as Tribe acknowledges, change is the
natural and desirable product of time and growth. 11 Moreover, it is often
difficult to ascertain fully what a nominee's attitudes truly are even at the
time of nomination. A good illustration of this is the Hughes nomination
of 1930. As visible a public figure as Hughes had been, his corporate law
practice led many progressives to assume that he would be a reactionary
Chief Justice. A lesson wisely drawn from the episode is that the place to
107. P. 69.
108. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 656 (1975). Thirty pages earlier-in a totally different
context, in which Tribe uses Vinson's reluctance to help show the difference that one Justice can
make-Tribe does offer the milder statement that "most observers believed that ...Vinson was
ambivalent about the constitutionality of school segregation, and uncertain about what position he
would take . . . ." P. 37.
109. The influence of Justices Holmes and Brandeis appears to have accounted in large part for
Stone's transformation. See Beard, Prefatory Note to S. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE
SUPREME COURT xix-xx (1945). See generally A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE
LAW 219-20, 304-07 (1956) (describing Stone's early relationship with Brandeis and later alliance
with Brandeis and Holmes).
110. It is a good guess that Warren would have been a different type of Chief Justice had he
remained subject to the pressures of California conservatives.
111. Pp. 103 ("Perhaps the most important qualification for being a Supreme Court Justice is the
possession of an open mind."), 74-75, 101. Such change may be largely attributable to the better
opportunity that the Supreme Bench offers for careful reflection. See McGrath v. Kristensen, 340
U.S. 162, 177-78 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring) (listing several "ways of gracefully and good-
naturedly surrendering former views to a better considered position").
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look for understanding of a nominee's judicial attitudes is "not in his file
of clients or in his safe-deposit box but at the books in his private library
at home."1112 But a mind-probing inquiry is a difficult one to make accu-
rately, and especially in an open forum like the Senate.1 3
B. A President's Impact
In contending that "a President with any skill and a little luck ...
can, with fair success, build the Court of his dreams,"1 "" Tribe over-
reaches mightily. Of course, the strawman with which Tribe does bat-
tle-that "Presidents cannot influence the Supreme Court through careful
appointments" 115 -is equally overdrawn. A more accurate assessment is
that a President can usually move the Court somewhat in the direction he
wants, with the extent and consistency of that movement depending in
large part on the President's luck; usually the movement is incremental,
and a single President can almost never make the Court extreme. We do
not need ideological review of Supreme Court nominations by the Senate
as a backstop to prevent the Court from veering off in a dangerous
direction.
Naturally, a President's ability to affect the Court increases with the
number of appointments he makes, but to get its way any number of Jus-
tices less than a majority must still persuade other colleagues. Tribe errs,
or at least stretches, in saying that "[i]t is far from uncommon for . . . a
majority of the Court to be the result of a single President's nomina-
tions." ' 8 Since 1869, when the number of seats on the Court was last set
112. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 359 (1941).
113. See infra text accompanying note 181. Part of the problen is that many nominees refuse to
discuss questions of judicial philosophy or constitutional law at their confirmation hearings, often
assertedly out of fear that such statements either would appear improper or might later require
recusal. Tribe recognizes the dangers of too particular an inquiry, and endorses Justice O'Connor's
refusal to predict how she would vote in future abortion cases. P. 101. And yet Tribe recommends
that the Senate make an extremely detailed inquiry into a nominee's views on some important issues
of the day, such as abortion. See pp. 98-100. One problem with a "too-deep probing" into the nomi-
nee's views on specific issues is that it "might be understood as seeking assurance of particular results
in individual cases, [which] is clearly an improper interference with the judicial function." McKay,
Selection of United States Supreme Court Justices, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 109, 131 (1960). On the other
hand, if the Senate contents itself with the broader species of questioning suggested by Tribe, such as,
"Does the nominee believe that the increasing complexity and danger of our world require giving the
President more discretionary power?", p. 104, it is unlikely that the questioning will derive very much
that is useful for decisionmaking. Interestingly, even during the Reagan Administration some liberal
Senators have opposed the idea that the Senate should delve too deeply into the ideology of judicial
nominees. See Kerry, On PrejudicingJustice, 81 HARV. L. REC. 13 (Oct. 18, 1985). Evidently, these
Senators fear that pressure from the ideological right is more likely to affect the Administration's
nominating policy than is pressure from Democrats. See also Mikva, supra note 81, at 40 (arguing
that, although it is appropriate for Senators to seek judges who in long run will do what Senators
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at nine, 117 only two Presidents, William Howard Taft and Franklin
Roosevelt, have appointed a majority of the Justices during a single Ad-
ministration, and only one more, Dwight Eisenhower, has done so during
two terms in office." 8
Even if a majority of the Justices is chosen by one President, two other
factors constrain the majority's ability to lead the Court to new frontiers.
First, in all likelihood the combined strength of death, resignation, and
retirement will soon dissolve the majority. Only between March 13, 1912
and July 12, 1914 was a majority on the Bench thanks to Taft;119 the
Eisenhower majority extended only from May 5, 1959 to April 1, 1962.
Roosevelt alone held a majority over an extended period, from January
15, 1940 to October 15, 1954, if nominees from both his second and third
terms are counted.
Second, it is unlikely that a one-President majority on the Court will
consistently pull together in the same direction, and especially unlikely
that it will do so to an extreme degree. This is attributable partly to the
consideration discussed in Section A, that some Justices tend to go off in
unanticipated directions, partly to the relatively slight emphasis placed on
ideology by some Presidents in selecting Justices,20 and partly to the rela-
tively moderate ideology of most Presidents. Thus, the period of Eisen-
hower majority on the Court, far from being one of stodgy conservatism,
coincided roughly with the blossoming of the Warren Court. The
Roosevelt Court, of course, was solid in support of expanding state and
federal economic power. Even on this issue, however, the change was ac-
complished mainly by Justices appointed by previous Presidents,' and as
the constitutional front moved to new ground, the Court became both per-
sonally and substantively fractious.' The last five Roosevelt Jus-
tices-Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson-did not consti-
tute in the aggregate either a united or an extreme phalanx.
117. Act of April 10, 1869, 16 Stat. 44.
118. The data used in this and the following paragraphs are taken from the table reprinted by
Tribe, pp. 142-51.
119. I do not count Chief Justice White in this computation, because Taft did not put him on the
Court, but only moved him from an Associate's chair to the center seat. If White is counted, the
period of Taft hegemony runs slightly more than five years, from December 15, 1910 to January 2,
1916.
120. See p. 52 (Eisenhower).
121. The so-called Revolution of 1937 was achieved before any of Roosevelt's nominees joined the
Court. The new Justices were, of course, critical in consolidating the changes, but even if they had
voted in the same proportions as did their senior colleagues, the results would not have changed in
such important cases as Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (5-0 vote by
Roosevelt appointees; 3-1 by others), and U.S. v. Darby, 313 U.S. 1 (1941) (5-0 vote by Roosevelt
appointees; 3-0 vote by others, one week after retirement of McReynolds, who presumably would
have dissented), both of which Tribe discusses, at pp. 68, 24, respectively.
122. See A. MASON, supra note 109, at 606-47.
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The case of the Taft appointees is somewhat less familiar. Perhaps that
is why Tribe misstates it so badly:
Although he was not as dogmatic in his conservatism as the late
nineteenth-century Presidents, Taft was determined to avoid nomi-
nees of the liberal stamp of Learned Hand, Louis Brandeis, or Ben-
jamin Cardozo. Taft regarded these potential candidates as nothing
less than "destroyers of the Constitution." Taft's selections but-
tressed the appointments of Presidents Harrison and Cleveland and
ensured that the Court would remain insensitive and even hostile to
the interests of working people and reformers throughout the first
third of the twentieth century.
1 2 3
And later, Tribe adds: "Taft's domination of Supreme Court appoint-
ments through the offices of both President and Chief Justice led to a
consistently conservative, anti-labor, anti-New Deal Court of his own
design."124
First, let's clear away some underbrush. Taft loathed Brandeis's views,
but it is absurd to think that, with any Republican President and Senate
of the time, the radical Boston lawyer could have been a "potential candi-
date." As for Hand and Cardozo, both were in their thirties when Taft
became President, and neither was then a potential candidate for the Su-
preme Court; in fact, far from displaying hostility to Hand, Taft ap-
pointed the young lawyer to a District Court seat. True, Taft as Chief
Justice counseled Warren Harding against nominating Hand and ex-
pressed reluctance concerning Cardozo. That was more than a decade
later, however, when Taft was a different and much more ideologically
rigid man,12 5 and even then he expressed great. respect for Cardozo.
126
Tribe greatly distorts Taft's role as Chief Justice in filling the Court.
1 27
123. P. 65.
124. P. 129; see also the rather heroic extension on p. 135 ("the three decades of Taft's domi-
nance of the selection process").
125. A. BICKEL & B. SCHmIDT, supra note 98, at 5-7, 9.
126. Tribe writes that Taft "smeared the alternative choices [to Pierce Butler]-dismissing the
eminent Judge Benjamin Cardozo as a 'Jew and a Democrat' . . . ." P. 129. This is a distortion of
Taft's letter to Harding, Dec. 4, 1922, William Howard Taft Papers (Library of Congress), which he
wrote after the Butler nomination and which related to another vacancy:
The best. Judge in the State of New York I suppose is Judge Cardozo. I have a letter from
Arthur Hadley recommending him. I enclose it. Cardozo is a Jew and a Democrat. I don't
think he would always side with Brandeis, but he is what they call a progressive judge. He is
an able man. His uncle, I think it was, was the Judge Cardozo who was impeached for
bribery back in Tweed's days, [in fact, it was Cardozo's father, who resigned just in time to
avoid impeachment] but this Judge has no spot on his record. I have assumed that you did not
desire to appoint two Democrats [Butler was a Democrat]--certainly not now, and therefore
that he was not on the eligible list.
127. Taft did not dominate Supreme Court appointments when he was Chief Justice. Although
he was successful in discouraging the candidacies of those he did not want to see on the Court, he did
not have a good record in getting his favorites on the Court. A. MASON, WiLuAM HOWARD TAFT:
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But this should not be distracting. The story on which to focus concerns
the Supreme Court appointments that Taft made when he was in the
White House.
Tribe's conclusory declaration notwithstanding, Taft was "relatively lit-
tle intent on a candidate's precise ideological orientation,"12 and in the
aggregate his appointees moved the 'Court noticeably to the left. In 1909
he appointed Horace Lurton, whom Theodore Roosevelt had nearly nom-
inated three years earlier. It was principally fear of partisan resistance
that had dissuaded Roosevelt,12 who in a letter to Lodge described Lur-
ton in glowing terms:
He is right on the negro question; he is right on the power of the
Federal Government; he is right on the insular business; he is right
about corporations; and he is right about labor.130
Plainly, no one perceived as a hardline conservative could earn such praise
from TR."'
Taft's second appointee, in 1910, was Charles Evans Hughes, the fight-
ing Governor of New York, who was one of the leading progressive politi-
cians of the day. 32 Hughes resigned to run for President six years later,
CHIEF JUSTICE 171-72 (1965); Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Supreme
Court Appointments, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 159, 188. Tribe errs rather drastically in stating that Taft
"pressured" Harding into nominating George Sutherland and Pierce Butler. P. 65. Sutherland, a
close Harding adviser, would have been appointed without Taft's influence; indeed, Sutherland had
been promised the first vacancy, which instead went to Taft. A. MASON, supra, at 171; Murphy,
supra, at 167. Taft enthusiastically supported the selection of Butler, "but he would have been as
well, if not better, pleased with John W. Davis." A. MASON, supra, at 168, 171; see Murphy, supra,
at 168-70 (before turning to Butler, Taft pressed for Davis or Nathan Miller); cf id. at 188 (Butler,
alone among the Associates appointed while Taft was Chief, was "Taft's choice"). He approved, but
was not particularly enthusiastic, about the appointment of Edward Sanford. A. MASON, supra, at
163-64, 171; Murphy, supra, at 182. Interestingly, the one nomination that Tribe does not mention
is that of Harlan Fiske Stone. Taft, probably claiming more than the facts warranted, proudly told his
son, "I rather forced the President into the appointment." Murphy, supra, at 186. One cannot help
but surmise that Tribe's failure to mention Taft's support of Stone is related to the fact that Stone
turned out to be a very progressive Justice, and "one of this century's most esteemed," p. 85.
128. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 9.
129. Id. at 8; Friedman, supra note 23, at 42.
130. 2 ROOSEVELT-LoDGE LETTRrS, supra note 85, at 228.
131. Roosevelt was mildly, and by no means uniformly, progressive on racial matters. See W.
GATEWOOD, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE ART OF CoNRovEmsY 37-39 (1970). But on the
subject of peonage, which he regarded as being the crucial aspect of the "Negro question" and a
reprehensible attempt to reintroduce slavery into the South, he was positively tigerish, and the issue
often guided his Southern judicial appointments. See Letter to Lyman Abbott, June 22, 1903, 3 LET-
TERS OF TR, supra note 91, at 501-02; Letter to Carl Schurz, Dec. 24, 1903, id. at 680; Letter to
James Ford Rhodes, Nov. 29, 1904, 4 LErERS OF TR, supra note 91, at 1050-51; letter to Henry
Smith Pritchett, Dec. 14, 1904, id. at 1067-68. On racial matters, Roosevelt seems to have misjudged
Lurton, see A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 79, 339-another Presidential surprise. In
fact, the only two dissenters in the great anti-peonage case of Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911),
were Holmes-a TR appointee-and Lurton.
132. See generally R. WESSER, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES: PoLICS AND REFORM IN NEw
YORK, 1905c1910 (1967).
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after one of the most remarkable and progressive short tenures in the
Court's history.133
In December 1910, Taft received an almost universally enthusiastic re-
action""' by promoting Edward D. White, who had been an able and
moderate Associate Justice,1 33 to the center seat. At the same time he
added to the Court Joseph R. Lamar and Willis Van Devanter. The re-
sponse to these nominations was more muted because neither man was
well-known, but generally favorable because, to most observers, neither
man appeared particularly likely to buttress the forces of reaction.
136 On
the same day, Taft made five nominations to the newly created Commerce
Court and two to the Interstate Commerce Commission. "At a mini-
mum," Professor Bickel has aptly written, "the general tone of opinion
about the appointments as a whole may be characterized by the comment
of the Kansas City Times, a Progressive newspaper: 'Some are obviously
admirable; none is obviously wrong.' "137
As for Taft's last nomination, Tribe says that the President
was less concerned with Mahlon Pitney's dubious intellectual gifts
than with the nominee's rigidly conservative political philosophy
... A handful of Senators more concerned about legal acumen
managed to hold up confirmation for a month. . . . [As Chief Jus-
tice] Taft began to see the wisdom of those Senators who had fought
the nomination [and] publicly pronounced Pitney to be a "weak
member" of the Court to whom he could "not assign cases."1 38
Tribe concentrates several errors into this brief passage:
(1) At the time of his nomination in 1912, Pitney did not appear to
have a "rigidly conservative political philosophy." He had, in fact, "dis-
133. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 398; F. RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1780 TO 1955, at 223 (1955); Note, Governor on the
Bench: Charles Evans Hughes as Associate Justice, 89 HARv. L. REV. 961 (1976).
134. Friedman, supra note 23, at 68.
135. See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 38. For example, White dissented in Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
(1895), and gave a crucial vote to the majority in Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). He did
not, however, consistently cast votes on the side considered progressive. Watts, Edward Douglass
White, in 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 57, at 1631, 1644-49. Tribe grudgingly concedes
that White was less doctrinaire than the other appointees of Grover Cleveland. P. 63.
136. See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 41:
There was not much scope in the cases [on which Lamar sat as a justice of the Supreme Court
of Georgia]. And yet there were some opinions at this stage of Lamar's career-as there were
not to be in his few years as a Justice-that are barely identifiable as mildly progressive in
tone and direction.
Van Devanter, before coming to the Supreme Court, was almost exclusively a politician and techni-
cian, a sound and brilliant lawyer, with a flat and sensible style; only in the 1920's and 1930's did his
ideological commitment emerge. See id. at 49-52, 326.
137. Id. at 61 (footnote omitted).
138. Pp. 82-83.
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played a generally hospitable attitude" toward "the few measures of social
and economic regulation" that had come before him as a high New Jerseyjudge."3  One important decision, George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Blow-
ers' Association,"'o betrayed Pitney's hardnosed attitude toward unions,
but that case stood out by itself in Pitney's record. "No wonder Taft could
see nothing objectionable in [that record], and probably no cause to fear
that anyone else would find it objectionable.""'
(2) The opposition to Pitney was not based on his perceived lack of
ability. In fact, Pitney was regarded nearly universally as an eminentjudge."" Rather, the opposition was based almost totally on the Jonas
case."" But the unions and progressive Senators failed to unite in protest
against the nomination; indeed, William Borah of Idaho led the forces in
its favor, and most progressive newspapers supported it. Thus, Pitney was
confirmed in 23 days.""
(3) Although Pitney was far from a giant, he was a respectable judge
and-putting ideology aside-a good one. 14  Far from belittling Pitney,
Taft as Chief Justice manifested respect for him."4  True, in 1922
Taft-in a letter to his brother, not publicly-described Pitney as a
"weak member" of the Court. But that was after Pitney had suffered a
breakdown in his health, including the beginnings of the arterial degener-
ation that soon after brought on a massive stroke and eventually killed
him. In the same letter, Taft also described as weak-all on grounds of
age or health-Justices McKenna, Day and, yes, Holmes. 47
139. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 333 (footnote omitted).
140. 77 N.J. Eq. 219 (1908).
141. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 334.
142. Id. at 330 (quoting The Outlook, Mar. 2, 1912); The New Supreme-Court Justice, 44 Lrr-
ERARY DIG. 410, 410 (1912).
143. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 330-34; Friedman, supra note 23, at 72 &
n.465.
144. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 324-32, Friedman, supra note 23, at 72-73.
145. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 334; 1 M. Pusty, supra note 56 ("high regard
of his brethren").
146. A. MAsoN, supra note 127, at 212 (1965) ("For a while Taft could turn to Mahlon Pitneyfor advice.") (footnote omitted). Mason's judgment is based at least in part on a letter, Taft to Pitney,
Mar. 31, 1922, William Howard Taft Papers (Library of Congress) (accepting suggestions, made in aletter of Pitney to Taft, March 30, 1922, for changes in an opinion, and saying, perhaps out ofpoliteness, "I can not say what a comfort it is to have you and brother Van Devanter go over my
work.").
147. Some of the context of Taft's letter must be given to realize just how badly Tribe mangles it:
Our Court is not in a strong condition. [Holmes has been doing his work, but is ill with
asthma.] Pitney, too, had a nervous breakdown last year, and he has a good many cases on hishands which he is not getting rid of. Day had the grip, and while he continues work-and
they all do in the sense that they attend conference-they are the weak members of the Court
to whom I cannot assign cases. The worst and most embarrassing member, however, is the
oldest member, McKenna. . . . In my judgment, both Holmes and McKenna ought to retire.
Letter of William Howard Taft to Horace D. Taft, Apr. 17, 1922, William Howard Taft Papers(Library of Congress).
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Taft's nominees, in short, ranged from moderately conservative to de-
cidedly progressive, from capable to outstanding. The net effect was not to
rigidify the Court but to move it noticeably in the progressive direction.
Indeed, the Taft nominations ushered in a brief period in which the Court
as a whole appeared to be mildly progressive-not consistently or ex-
tremely so, to be sure, but markedly so in comparison to the Court of a
few years before or a few years after.
148
The Taft nominations thus fit easily in the general pattern. An individ-
ual President can nudge the Court, and even achieve dramatic short-term
results, but it is difficult for him to fashion the Court in his image over
the long-term and nearly impossible for him to make the Court extreme.
Of course, the nominations of two or more successive Presidents may move
the Court in the same direction; as Tribe points out, "even Supreme
Courts whose composition is the work of several presidential hands can be
remarkably uniform in outlook . . . . Supreme Courts of varied origin
have given us decisions that are remarkably monolithic." 4
9 But if such a
monolith is erected over decades, and is the product of different Presidents
elected in different eras, it is generally difficult to characterize as ex-
treme.1 50 And even if we believe the extremist label sometimes does fit the
Court, we must still ask the question to which we now turn: Would
things really turn out any better if the Senate took a more active ideologi-
cal role?
C. The Senate's Impact
Another of the "myths" that Tribe contests is that of "the spineless
Senate"-"that the Senate has historically treated Supreme Court nomi-
nations much like a President's choice of Attorhey General or even of
Postmaster General, usually deferring and giving the Chief Executive the
'man he wants.' """ Again, Tribe does battle with straw; if anyone really
148. See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 201-02, 316-17 (many progressive deci-
sions rendered in 1910-14 period, but not representing general capacity of accommodation to chang-
ing conditions; effect of personnel changes during Wilson Administration was to make Court less
progressive); F. RODELL, supra note 133, at 188:
[A]fter Fuller was succeeded in 1910 by White,. .. the Court relaxed for six or seven years
its laissez faire rigidity. . until America entered the first World War. That this compara-
tively liberal interlude almost precisely coincided with the first of Charles Evans Hughes's two
terms of service on the high bench was not entirely coincidental ...
149. P. 109.
150. Indeed, the "remarkably uniform" outlooks of various Presidents' appointees tends to under-
cut Tribe's contention that a President can have confidence that his appointees will support his
outlook.
Significantly, although the present Court is dominated by the presence of four nominees of Richard
Nixon and one of Ronald Reagan, Tribe does not regard it as extreme. On the contrary, he contends
that "there is much to applaud in its jurisprudence" and answers a "resounding yes" to the question
of whether it reflects a "balance . . . worth saving." P. 111.
151. P. 78.
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believes in this myth, a glance at the back of Charles Warren's classic
history of the Supreme Court 52 should be sufficient to show that at times
the Senate has been downright ornery. Nor would one have to delve very
deep into Warren to confirm that Senatorial opposition has often been
based on what Tribe calls the "political, judicial, and economic philoso-
phies" of the nominees.1 5 The more difficult questions are whether,
viewed from the historical perspective, such ideological review has done
substantial good, and whether more of it would have been a good thing.
Determining whether a political act has worked for well or ill is, of
course, a highly subjective matter, unless we are looking back across a
sufficient historical distance to yield a measure of consensus. Consider
therefore the half century or so ending in 1937. This is a crucial test era,
for there now seems to be universal agreement that the Court then per-
formed poorly in many respects, its decisions hindering more often .than
fostering social progress. But certainly-putting aside for the moment the
1930's-the Senate did not use its power over Court nominees to alter
that situation. And if the Senate had been more aggressive, it almost cer-
tainly would have made the Court less, rather than more, progressive.
For example, Tribe makes much of the conservative appointments of
Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland.'M But he does not suggest
that, had the Senate played a greater role in selecting the Justices during
this period, the complexion of the Court would have changed. Nor could
he, for the Senate of the late nineteenth century was a conservative body,
the least popular institution in government, because it appeared to be the
most powerful and insistent in thwarting the public will.1 55
Nor did that situation change dramatically with the new century; Theo-
dore Roosevelt needed all his extraordinary resourcefulness to achieve his
remarkable legislative record over the resistance of an often hostile Con-
gress dominated in both houses by the Old Guard. 5 In 1906 TR nomi-
nated William H. Moody in the face of warnings that Moody's strenuous
progressivism would raise objections in the Senate. The opposition soon
collapsed, notwithstanding a notable lack of enthusiasm for Moody in the
Senate, because in that era Senators were not disposed to struggle with
Presidents over the personnel of the Court.1 57 That same attitude helped
account for the quick evaporation of the traces of Senate opposition, all
152. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 61, at 757-63.
153. P. 92.
154. Pp. 63-64, 65.
155. D. ROTHMAN, POLITICS AND PowER: THE UNrTED STATES SENATE, 1869C1901, at
243-49 (1966).
156. See, e.g., W. HARBAtrH, supra note 87, at 235-52, 363-68; J. BLum, THE REPUBUCAN
ROOSEVELT 87-105 (1954) (2d ed. 1977).
157. Friedman, supra note 23, at 47, 67.
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from Southern conservatives, to Hughes in 1910.58 But it did not prevent
a battle royal six years later.
"There is no doubt," concedes Tribe, "that the Senate has sometimes
abused its power. The unsuccessful opposition to Woodrow Wilson's nom-
ination of Louis Brandeis in 1916 was fueled as much by anti-Semitism as
by legitimate objections to the nominee's progressive philosophy."15 And
thus, in the blink of an eye, Tribe disposes of what still stands as the
bitterest nomination controversy in the history of the Court.
The Brandeis affair simply cannot be "distinguished away" from mod-
ern concerns because it involved anti-Semitism, which presumably is now
unlikely to reappear with such virulence in a confirmation battle. Al-
though much was made of Brandeis's Jewishness, it played a subsidiary
role in the dispute, 60 primarily to emphasize in the minds of some oppo-
nents16' that Brandeis was an outsider-"not a fit person to be a member
of the Supreme Court"'63 because he did not adhere to the unwritten code
of the legal establishment.' At base, the episode was ideological, "a fight
for the soul of the Supreme Court."" And for our present purpose, two
facts stand out. First, in that struggle it was the nominee, not his Senate
opponents, who represented the progressive forces in society and the pros-
pect of a Court more attuned to the public will.'6 5 Second, had the Presi-
dent not applied his full political weight, the opposition might have pre-
vailed, 66 thus keeping off the Court "one of this century's most esteemed
Justices."'' 1 7
Not until Herbert Hoover became President did the Senate object to a
158. N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1910, at 2, col. 4.
159. P. 91.
160. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 367 ("The attacks on Brandeis were personal
and ideological, with a leavening of anti-Semitism"); A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE
468-69, 483, 490, 505-08 (1946). To some extent, fears of appearing anti-Semitic might have inhib-
ited potential opponents of Brandeis. See A. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL 81 (1964).
161. Certainly not all; for example, the most vociferous opponent to Brandeis, former President
Taft, appears to have been free of any traces of anti-Semitism. A. TODD, supra note 160, at 216-17,
256-57.
162. This was the opinion offered by Elihu Root, then president of the American Bar Association,
and six former presidents. Id. at 159.
163. See A. MASON, supra note 160, at 507-08; A. TODD, supra note 160, at 249-50; A. BICKEL
& B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 375.
164. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, supra note 98, at 367.
165. Only part of the Senate that considered Brandeis was chosen by popular election under the
Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution; as Tribe says, p. 132, the electoral process for both the
President and the Senate is far more democratic now than it was in earlier years. See also supra note
24.
166. See J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 111-112 (1953); A. TODD,
supra note 160, at 212-15, 229-34, 239-41. Although the final margin of victory was wide, the key
vote was the 10-8 tally in the Judiciary Committee. The committee vote was strictly by party, and the
floor vote nearly so; Wilson's pressure dragged some reluctant Democrats into line. A. MASON, supra
note 160, at 501-05.
167. P. 85.
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nominee as being too little, rather than too much, in the progressive
camp.'6 8 But consider the results and the near results. The opposition to
Hughes in 1930 failed, but it was nevertheless very substantial. 8 As we
have seen, 17  that opposition was misguided; considering Hughes's subse-
quent career and the range of Hoover's potential backup choices for the
vacancy, it might also have been disastrous.
Later the same year, the Senate rejected Circuit Judge John J. Parker,
who was perceived as being hostile to blacks and labor. In his place Hoo-
ver nominated Owen J. Roberts, who was readily accepted by the Senate
in large part because his vigorous prosecution of the Teapot Dome scan-
dal gave the impression that he was a progressive.17 ' This episode in par-
ticular provides an important test-recent enough for the issues to be fa-
miliar, distant enough to be viewed with perspective, with a rejection
based purely on perceived substantive views followed by confirmation. of a
nominee satisfactory to the Senate. Three times Tribe parades the substi-
tution of Roberts for Parker as a demonstration of the good that Senate
rejection can do. Tribe's argument, a truly astonishing one, is that Rob-
erts's "famous 'switch in time' vote of 1937 . . .helped defuse the Court-
packing crisis." 172 It is only pardonable curiosity to ask whether Justice
Roberts in his pre-switch incarnation may have been responsible in some
substantial degree for precipitating the crisis, and whether Parker might
have opposed the Court's right wing, even before 1937 and even without
the necessity of a switch.
Both answers are quite clearly affirmative. Although even before 1937
Roberts sometimes displayed a moderate side,173 in several highly-charged
cases of great political significance he cast a decisive vote on the side of the
Court's conservative Four Horsemen; 74 the crisis might have been averted
168. Perhaps the nomination of Mahlon Pitney is an exception, but there the progressives were
divided and the opposition was narrowly based. See supra text accompanying notes 139-44.
169. Apart from including this episode in the table at the back of his book, see pp. 148-49 (52-26
confirmation vote), Tribe mentions it not at all.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 56 and 112.
171. See Anderson, The Supreme Court Victory, 130 NATIoN 598, 599 (1930); Burner, Owen J.
Roberts, 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 57, at 2251, 2255; 105 LITERARY DIG. 9 (May
24, 1930).
172. P. 91; accord pp. 34, 135. Roberts, it appears, did not switch his vote on the minimum wageissue in response to Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 311 (1955). However, sometime between Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.
587 (1936), and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), he dramatically changed his
stance on this issue.
173. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding statute setting retail milk
prices). Even after 1937, Roberts remained essentially a conservative judge, see, e.g., Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
174. Probably the most important examples are Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.
587 (1936) (invalidating minimum wage law), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)(invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935). Others include R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Alton, 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating compulsory retirement and pension plan for interstate carri-
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had a more consistently progressive Justice been in his place. And, with
the switch of one vote in the Senate, Parker might very well have been
that Justice.' It now seems clear that the Senate judged Parker's views
on race176 and labor 17 7 too harshly, and his distinguished and generally
liberal record over the next twenty-eight years on the Fourth Circuit'
ers), and Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (inval-
idating statute granting bankruptcy relief for governmental units). It is noteworthy that, in each of
these cases, Hughes-whom the progressives had opposed in 1930-joined the Court's three liberals
in dissent, although in Carter he agreed with the majority with respect to part of the statute at issue.
In U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 53 (1936), one of the most important cases in bringing on the crisis,
Roberts and Hughes joined the conservatives in holding the first Agricultural Adjustment Act
unconstitutional.
175. Medina, John Johnston Parker 1885<1958, 38 N.C. L. RFv. 299, 303-04 (1958) (likely
that several key cases would have been decided differently, and that Roosevelt would not have offered
Court-packing plan, had Parker been confirmed).
176. The racial opposition was based entirely on a disparaging statement by Parker concerning
the prospect of a greater black role in politics. Parker made the statement in 1920, while running as
the Republican candidate for Governor of North Carolina, in response to Democrats' charges that he
was trying to organize blacks as a political force. Parker received a strong black vote in the election,
and his nomination to the Court was supported by leading blacks in North Carolina. Confirmation of
Hon. John J. Parker to be an Associate Justice of the Siupreme Court of the United States: Hearing
before the Subcom. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-79 (1930), reprinted
in 9 R. MERSKY & J. JACOBSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY
THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916<1975 (1977). Parker's opponents ignored not only his
own self-serving denial of prejudice, see Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d sess., at 7794, but also
City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1930) (per curiam), the one case in which he had
already ruled on a constitutional question involving racial matters. There the court, with Parker pre-
siding, invalidated a discriminatory zoning ordinance; the outcome followed, but was not totally con-
trolled by, Supreme Court precedent.
After his rejection, Parker had-with one glaring exception-a progressive record on racial issues.
In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Tunstall, 163 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
841 (1947), after the Supreme Court, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), reversed a per curiam decision denying
jurisdiction, 140 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1930), Parker wrote for the court in upholding a damages verdict
for a black workman against a union that had discriminatorily refused to represent him in collective
bargaining. In Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948), he
wrote for the Court in invalidating a primary held under discriminatory party rules. His opinion
compares favorably to the dissent of Justice Roberts in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666
(1944)-and, for that matter, to Roberts's opinion for the Court in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45
(1935). While ordering equal facilities in public schools, Parker refused absent Supreme Court lead-
ership to order desegregation, Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (D.S.C. 1952), rev'd by Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but he was vigorous in enforcing the rule of Brown, see, e.g.,
Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957).
177. The labor opposition was based almost entirely on International Organization, United Mine
Workers v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927), in which Parker
wrote for the Court in upholding an injunction that, inter alia, forbade the union from inducing
workers to breach "yellow dog" contracts. On this point, Parker deemed Hitchman Coal & Coke Co.
v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917), as controlling, see 18 F.2d at 848-49, a judgment that was at least
defensible, sei 2 G. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 758-59 n.4 (1938). Although
there is not evident in Red Jacket any strain to avoid Hitchman, neither does it manifest the hostility
to unions that labor perceived. Ironically, organized labor "later criticized Roberts acidly," Burner,
supra note 171, at 2255.
178. See Warren,JohnJ. Parker, 33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 649, 650 (1958) ("His philosophy was that
of a practical liberal . . . .He would truly have been a great Justice of [the Supreme] Court.");
Medina, supra note 175, at 303 (Justice Stone's "point of view was strikingly similar to that of Judge
Parker, both on the subject of the power to deal with economic threats and the power of the courts to
safeguard the rights of individuals vis-a-vis the government"); id. at 306 ("a massive record of sound
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supports the generally held view that his rejection was a grievous error.7
Apart from offering the conclusory and evidently inaccurate declaration
that "Justice Roberts was, of course, less wedded to the wisdom of the
past," ' Tribe does nothing to dispel this view.
The 1930 confirmation episodes highlight the fact that, in attempting to
judge what a nominee's views will likely be on the Supreme Court, the
Senate will often err; indeed, the progressives in 1930 batted oh-for-three,
placing Hughes and Parker too far to the right and Roberts too far to the
left.181 By now, this should not be surprising. In trying to assess and pre-
dict the outlook of a nominee, the Senate is burdened with all the same
problems that face a President, and potentially more: The Senate is less
likely than the President and his advisers to know the nominee intimately,
less able to consider the nominee's record reflectively, and more subject to
interest group pressures that may magnify stray events and nominees', past
statements beyond their real significance.
III. SUMMING UP THE LEDGER
Part II has reviewed the historical record to show that the benefits of
ideological opposition to Supreme Court nominees are less than may ap-
pear. This part will examine other, less historically oriented considera-
law"); Burris, The Senate Rejects a Judge: A Study of the John J. Parker Case 30 (1962) ("distin-
guished and liberal record"); N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1958, at p. 29, col. I ("reputation as one of the
most distinguished jurists on the Federal bench"); cf W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS,
1939,c1975, at 16-17, 191 (1980) ("differences between Parker and Roberts in the broad sweep of
the law were not marked"; "each sat way to the right of center," but Parker was "much the superiorjudge"). After his rejection, Parker "wrote decisions welcomed by New Dealers, notably one uphold-
ing the constitutionality of loans by the Public Works Administration," N.Y. Times, supra, at 29, col.
1. In that case, Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 81 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 299 U.S. 259 (1936), and Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 91 F.2d 665 (1937),
affd, 302 U.S. 485 (1938), Parker applied, over dissent, a broad view of the federal spending power.
Some sense of Parker's remarkable career on the Fourth Circuit can be gleaned from the proceed-
ings held in his memory by that court, In Memoriam: Honorable John Johnston Parker (Apr. 22,
1958) reprinted in 253 F.2d. [hereinafter cited as Proceedings]. For summaries of Parker's jurispru-
dence by judges who knew him well, see Watkins, A Great Judge and a Great American: Chief
Judge John J. Parker, 1885,1958, 44 A.B.A.J. 448, 449 (1958) (Parker's participation in numer-
ous decisions involving expanding federal powers of economic regulation demonstrated his belief that
age-old principles must be adapted to meet changing conditions); Phillips, A Tribute toJudgeJohnJ.
Parker-"The Gladsome Light of Jurisprudence," 37 N.C.L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1958) (same).
179. Warren, supra note 178, at 650 (Parker's "practical liberal" philosophy "has been attested
to by many of the Senators whose votes . . . prevented him from being confirmed"); Proceedings,
supra note 178, at 14 ("Many who opposed confirmation of his nomination were to acknowledge
publicly that they had made a regrettable and serious mistake."); Burris, supra note 178, at 30 ("It is
now generally conceded that Parker was wrongly condemned."); H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESI-
DENTs 200 (2d ed. 1985) (Parker rejection "now all but universally regarded not only as unfair and
regrettable but as a blunder"); W. DOUGLAS, supra note 178, at 17 (concluding on basis of Parker-
Roberts episode that "the wisdom of the Senate is not always apparent"); see id. at 191.
180. P. 91.
181. In 1937, Senator Burton K. Wheeler acknowledged the wrong guesses on both Hughes and
Roberts. W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 320 (1974).
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tions that also limit the benefit gained by opposing a nominee of distaste-
ful views. It will then look at the cost side of the ledger, and finally offer a
standard for determining when ideological opposition is appropriate.
A. The Benefit Side, Continued
The President's second bite. Even if the Senate does reject the first
nominee, usually the same President will name the second."82 And, unless
the President is willing to back down, the viewpoint of the second nomi-
nee may not be dramatically different from that of the first. Unless the
Senate is willing to endure a stalemate, during which there will be an
empty seat on the Supreme Bench, it may then be the one forced to re-
treat. Thus, the Senate of 1930, having endured two bruising confirmation
battles in confirming Hughes and rejecting Parker, was eager to perceive
Roberts as a progressive."83 Thus too, after defeating Clement F. Hayn-
sworth and G. Harrold Carswell, Richard Nixon's first two nominees for
a vacancy, Senate liberals appeared eager to confirm Harry A. Blackmun
and thus avoid a third fight."8 To the extent that the battles against
Haynsworth and Carswell were actually fought on ideological turf,185 the
Senate campaign could not be claimed as a clear success, because Black-
mun-whatever he may have since become-appeared at the time to be a
rather conservative judge.18 Perhaps Morris Udall had this episode in
mind after the nomination of his fellow Arizonan, Sandra Day O'Connor,
when he wrote: "My Democratic friends ought to be grateful . . . .It's
182. This need not be true when the nomination is toward the end of a Presidential term. Not
surprisingly, a disproportionate number of rejections have occurred during the last year of a Presi-
dent's administration. Resistance during that year thus offers opponents of a nomination somewhat
greater hope of advancing their objectives than in other years. In addition, they can then offer the
argument that a nomination with such long-term potential significance should be made by a President
with a fresh mandate.
183. See supra text accompanying note 171.
184. See McConnell, Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate Standard of Excellence, 59 Ky.
L.J. 7, 24-28 (1970).
185. See Grossman & Wasby, The Senate and Supreme Court Nominations: Some Reflections,
1972 DUKE L.J. 557, 577 (conflict of interest issue in Haynsworth case may have "provided a con-
venient justification for opposition generated in fact by ideological or political considerations"; "the
liberal-conservative orientation, not party or region of the voting senators, was the important determi-
nant of voting behavior" on Haynsworth and Carswell).
186. See N.Y. Times, April 15, 1970, at 34, col. 4 (Judge Blackmun "appears strikingly like Mr.
Burger in judicial philosophy."); Jenkins, A Candid Talk withJustice Blackmun, N.Y. Times Maga-
zine, Feb. 20, 1983, p. 20, at 22 ("Justice Blackmun was initially typecast as the subordinate half of
the 'Minnesota Twins,' and therefore an appendage of the Chief Justice. . . .No longer a conserva-
tive, Justice Blackmun has become a pragmatic, strongly independent jurist who more often than not
votes with the Court's two more liberal Justices."). Statistics give some indication of Justice Black-
mun's ideological transformation. In the 1971 term, Justice Blackmun voted with Justice Rehnquist
(then in his first term on the Court) 81.0% of the time and with Justice Brennan only 48.3% of the
time. The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 308. In the 1984 term, Justice Black-
mun voted with Justice Rehnquist 70.3% of the time and with Justice Brennan 79.2% of the time.
The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARV. L. REv. 120, 323.
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almost inconceivable to me that they could do any better. Ronald Reagan
isn't going to appoint liberal Democrats."1817
The lone wolfs limited bite. A single Justice, no matter how extreme,
cannot make the Court itself extremist. Of course, as I have already ac-
knowledged, a single Justice can have an important impact on the na-
tion; 88 to demonstrate this point convincingly requires little more than the
recitation of a long series of 5-4 decisions dating back to the mid-19th
century. 9 But Tribe carries his argument further, pointing out that "one
Justice can often make much more than one vote's difference." A Justice
can do this, Tribe argues, principally by acting as a catalyst, leading the
Court to "new frontiers of constitutional law" through the use of what
Tribe aptly calls "persuasive judicial skills."190
That is certainly true enough, but Tribe's phrase suggests its own cru-
cial limitations: For the most part, a single Justice can exert power tran-
scending his vote only by persuading other Justices,"' and his views can
prevail only if at least half of the Court agrees with him. The vote of an
extremist Justice counts no more than those of his more moderate col-
leagues-and no more than would the vote of a second-choice appointee of
the same President.
True, a Justice may affect the law crucially even without persuading
his own colleagues, by writing a persuasive dissent or concurrence that
successfully "appeal[s] to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence
of a future day." '192 But this impact will occur only if the opinion has
persuasive power and, in general, only if it persuades the majority of a
latter-day Court.
No one denies that a single Justice, any Justice, can have enormous
impact on the nation; it is highly unlikely, however, that a single extrem-
ist Justice will have an extreme impact.
Balance over the long run. Over the long run, Senatorial opposition is
unlikely to move the Court much in one direction or the other, for the
Senate may be to the right of the President about as often as it is to the
187. Udall, A Master Stroke, Wash. Post, July 13, 1981, at A13, col. 2.
188. See supra text accompanying note 23; p. 31. Tribe contests, p. 31, the comments by Justice
Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 24, that "Supreme Court appointments almost invariably come 'one at a
time,'" and that the Court is "far more dominated by centrifugal forces, pushing towards individual-
ity and independence, than it is by centripetal forces pulling for hierarchical ordering and institutional
unity." Unlike Tribe, I do not believe that Justice Rehnquist meant by these points to "deny. . . the
idea that one or two Justices can make a major difference at the Court." P. 31. But they do support




191. One important exception to this statement, and its impact on the Senate's role in reviewing
nominees for the Court, are discussed infra, Part III(C).
192. C. HUGHES, supra note 83, at 68.
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left.'93 Indeed, a Senator deciding whether to reject a nominee whose sub-
stantive views he finds distasteful might well take into account the possi-
bility that, as viewed from the perspective of later years, he would find the
nominee's views to be correct, or at least more acceptable.", It is not a
bad thing to exercise some humility in dealing with difficult issues of
long-term significance.' 95
B. The Cost Side
The considerations discussed in Part II and in Section A of this Part
limit the benefit of ideological opposition, but they do not by themselves
demonstrate that the Senate should refrain from such opposition. However
difficult prediction is, the Senate can probably do it better by exercising its
considered judgment than, say, by flipping a coin. And it is an essential
part of our constitutional structure that the Senate exercise that judgment
rather than rubber stamp decisions made by the President.
Thus, if there were no costs to ideological resistance, I would still re-
gard it as worthwhile for whatever value it might have. In some contexts,
however, it is appropriate for one branch to defer to the choices of an-
other, at least within broad bounds, because refusal to defer carries poten-
tial costs.' 96 And active ideological opposition to Supreme Court nomina-
tions does not come cost-free.
One cost of rejecting a Supreme Court nominee is obvious: For a time,
the Court is not at full strength. Accordingly, it may hesitate to decide its
most controversial cases, and in some cases fewer than five votes will de-
termine the disposition. That cost is usually acceptable, but it may become
less so if the Senate digs in its heels and repeatedly blocks the President's
attempts to fill a vacancy-a possibility that is much greater when opposi-
tion is based on ideology rather than on competence or temperament. And
this cost of ideological resistance may become least tolerable precisely
when the apparent benefit is greatest-when several vacancies give a sin-
gle President an opportunity to change the complexion of the Court very
193. Moreover, ideological opposition from one side of the political spectrum is likely to help
generate similar opposition in later cases from the other side. Cf. McConnell, supra note 184, at 9
(Senate considered Haynsworth nomination in light of "recent precedent for senatorial questioning"
set by Senate's consideration of nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice).
194. Cf p. 58 ("It is a sobering postscript ... that Jackson's jihad against the Bank of the
United States had a very real and genuinely ironic impact on the farmers, laborers and common
people for whom he took up the sword ... [because it played] a large part in triggering the devastat-
ing economic depression of 1837.").
195. See p. 103 (quoting Oliver Cromwell's plea, "Brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech
you, bethink you that you may be mistaken.").
196. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 191, 202-03 (Court's responsibility at times to defer
to other branches).
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substantially-for then failure to confirm nominees would leave the Court
debilitated.
There is another cost of ideological resistance, more subtle yet more
significant, that Tribe never considers. Perceptions of the Court substan-
tially shape the nature of the confirmation process, and history and logic
strongly suggest that the relationship also runs the other way.197 Rarely is
public attention focused on the Court as intensely as during a confirma-
tion struggle. Extended debates, both within the Senate and beyond, con-
cerning recent decisions and the political philosophy of a nominee cannot
help but diminish the Court's reputation as an independent institution
and impress upon the public-and indeed on the Court itself-a political
perception of its role. As the experience of the Reconstruction Era indi-
cates, when Senators treat the Court as a political institution expected to
hew to a particular ideological line, the public is likely to see the Court in
the same light.198 And so is the Court itself; both the memory and the
anticipation of confirmation battles can substantially affect the actual role
of the Court. A Justice who reaches the Court only in the face of doubts
concerning his ideological acceptability may bear scars that will affect his
judicial behavior.19 Perhaps more clearly and importantly, if unpopular
Supreme Court decisions tend to lead to nasty confirmation controversies
that put the Court in an unfavorable light, then it is natural to expect that
the Court will be less willing to render such decisions.
To most of us-including Tribe, I believe-such a chilling effect would
be unfortunate. Even to the extent that the Court may be considered a
policymaking institution, we do not accord it power because it is politi-
cally accountable; on the contrary, it is the Court's independence that we
prize. The Court is useful in our system of government, able to play a
role distinct from those of the political branches, precisely because it is,
and is perceived to be, different from those branches.2 00
This distinction has two aspects. On the one side is the assertive aspect:
Because the Court is removed from ordinary political pressures, it is better
197. Friedman, supra note 23, at 84 & n. 550.
198. See id. at 5-26.
199. See Mikva, supra note 81, at 39 ("What the Senate ought not do is determine, through
questioning, a nominee's views on emerging constitutional doctrine, or issues likely to face courts in
the near future. Why? Because these questions are really a signal to a nominee that he will become ajudge only if he promises to be obsequious, to be a yes man to the powers that be."); R. Friedman,
Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 1930-1941, at 145a (1978) (unpublished thesis, Oxford Uni-
versity) (Hughes's assignment practices as Chief Justice were affected by his recollection of the differ-
ent receptions that liberals accorded his nomination and that of Roberts); McKay, supra note 113, at
131.
200. The recent unhappy experience of the California Supreme Court illustrates vividly how the
image of even a very distinguished court can be badly tarnished by close political review. Of course,
the review of the California court is more potent than that of the United States Supreme Court
because it operates on the court's sitting, as well as prospective, members.
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able than the other branches to render unpopular decisions, and thus to
perform what may be its most important constitutional role-protecting
the rights of individuals and the politically weak." 1
On the other side is the passive aspect: Because the Court is not chosen
democratically, it must not insert its judgment on matters of policy in
place of that of the political branches. Thus, a Justice properly perform-
ing his function cannot give force to those policy views without restraint.
Tribe recognizes this: "That there is much a judge could not properly do
in the [Constitution's] name is true enough."20' 2 And in another context he
points out that "sometimes the Court best guarantees our rights by defer-
ring to, rather than overruling, the political branches."203 That, indeed, is
the chief lesson of the crisis that culminated in 1937. Acknowledging that
a judge's philosophical and political beliefs profoundly influence his deci-
sions does not require us to regard him as an ordinary high political
officer.
Both aspects of this distinction are crucial; if the distinction between the
judiciary and the political branches blurs, so will the role of the Court.
20 4
And if the Senate treats a Supreme Court nomination as an ordinary po-
litical matter, albeit one of great national significance, the distinction is
sure to blur.
C. An Alternative Standard
The foregoing analysis suggests to me that, in general, the long-run
benefit of ideological opposition is too uncertain and too limited to be
worth the very substantial costs that it entails. But a Senator should not
put ideological considerations totally out of mind. He should satisfy him-
self that the nominee does not hold views that the Senator regards as so
repugnant that he perceives harm merely in giving the nominee the op-
portunity to air them from the platform of the Supreme Court. If the
nominee falls to meet this test, then I believe the balance of costs and
benefits swings the other way and the Senator should vote against
confirmation.
This standard takes into account the educational function that is a by-
201. See Mikva, supra note 81, at 39 ("The line we are concerned about in judicial selection is
between a judge who constantly remembers who appointed him and a judge who remembers that
popular decisions can be made easily by the popular branches of the government, but that his function
is to protect minority rights from majority passions.").
202. P. 48 (emphasis in original).
203. P. 10.
204. See Mikva, supra note 81, at 40 ("When the Court is perceived as an apolitical, wise, and
impartial tribunal, the American people have evinced a willingness to abide by its decisions. But if the
Court is viewed simply as a Congress in black robes, the Court's ability to perform its constitutional
function is threatened.").
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product of the Court's decisions. All Supreme Court opinions, even lone
dissents, have a measure of authority in the public eye by virtue of their
high source. They thus lend legitimacy to the views they espouse. All be-
liefs are worthy of expression in our society, but some should not be ex-
pressed from one of the nine seats on the Supreme Court. One Justice
holding such views can do significant harm even without the concurrence
of other Justices.
Moreover, if the nominee has expressed such views already, it is not as
likely as in the ordinary case that the Senate's assessment of the nominee's
outlook is mistaken; nor is it likely that the nominee will have an ideologi-
cal conversion once on the Bench. Unless the President himself is an
equally fervent extremist, rejection of such a nomination is unlikely to
create a deadlock. Furthermore, although individual Senators would natu-
rally vary in their application of this standard, they need not fear that
invoking it would later haunt them by inviting retaliation from the other
side of the political fence; a Senator should be well satisfied if the stan-
dard is applied equally to extremists of the left or right. Such a nominee
should be rejected without fear of harming the selection process or the
Court itself.
But the category of beliefs covered by this standard is a narrow one,
including only those that a Senator considers beyond the realm of rational
political discourse in the nation, not those-such as abortion-at the heart
of the controversy. Surely a nominee holding such abhorrent views will
rarely be named, and it must be rarer still that a nominee would fail this
standard and yet satisfy the Senate with respect to his ability, tempera-
ment, and integrity. Those should be the principal criteria that the Senate
uses in reviewing Supreme Court nominations.
I do not pretend that considerations of ideology are always clearly dis-
tinct from those of ability and temperament, or even from those of integ-
rity. In some cases, a Senator who espouses the standard I suggest but
who dislikes the nominee's views may be able to say, "Anybody who takes
that position clearly doesn't understand the Constitution," or "If that's her
attitude toward precedent, she doesn't have the judicial temperament that
the Court needs." But the prospect of some slippage in applying my stan-
dard does not render the standard invalid; although there is no way to
eliminate ideology from the review of Supreme Court nominations, a Sen-
ator adhering conscientiously to an austere attitude can narrowly confine
its role.
If the Senate follows this approach, it will of course occasionally aban-
don the opportunity to prevent a decision or line of decisions that it deems
unfavorable. Such self-restraint demands of the Senate a sense of constitu-
tional courage: It must recognize that some choices in our government are
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meant to be the province of other branches; it must have faith that im-
proper choices can eventually be corrected by the constitutional processes;
and it must believe that assuring desired judicial results is less important
than preserving the structural integrity of our government.
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